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NOTE
TRUTH IN TESTING LAWS: A SHOT IN
THE ARM FOR DESIGNER GENE TESTS
Alexander van Voorheest
Only four years ago, President Clinton announced that the human
genome had been successfully sequenced; the federal project encom-
passed nine years of research at a cost of nearly three billion dollars.'
This past year, a genomics startup revealed that it could successfully
decode a person's DNA in about ten days.2 In the fifty years that have
passed since Watson and Crick first announced the famous double-
helical structure of DNA to the world,3 scientists have made astound-
ing progress towards understanding human genetics: recent break-
throughs have inspired both hope and alarm.4
The technology has developed so fast that genetic tests like
sports-aptitude profiling are closer to reality than to science fiction.5
Recently, scientists in Australia began using DNA samples collected
from elite athletes to attempt to identify children who may be future
stars.6 The group has identified two genes they believe provide power
and stamina, and the Australian company Genetic Technologies now
I J.D. Candidate 2006, Case Western Reserve University. I would like to
thank Professor Jessica Berg for introducing me to the material and providing helpful
comments throughout the writing process. Of course, this Note would never have
been started, let alone finished, without the continuing love and support of my wife.
1 MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND THE
FuTuRE OF SOCIETY 5-6 (2003).
2 David Stipp, Speed-Reading Your Genes; Using Biochips, Perlegen Could
Turn Our Genetic Uniqueness into Gold, FORTUNE, Sept. 1, 2003, at 150.
3 For an interesting discussion of the events leading up to the announce-
ment, see BILL BRYSON, A SHORT HISTORY OF NEARLY EVERYTHING 397-417 (2003).
4 Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, 29
AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 77 (2003).
5 In fact, a rugby team in Australia is already using the technology to tailor
its training programs. Carina Dennis, Rugby Team Converts to Give Gene Tests a Try,
434 NATURE 260, 260 (2005).
6 Martin Wallace, Athens Day 14 the Verdict: DNA Tests to Find Our Stars
of the Future, ADVERTISER (Sydney, Austl.), Aug. 27, 2004, at 5.
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sells a test for these genes.7 They market the product as "designer
athlete" technology under the pretext that it can tell parents whether
their child may be predisposed to excel at a particular sport.8 Genetic
Technologies's home testing kit is now sold to Australians for about
one-hundred U.S. dollars via the Internet; next year, the genetic test
will be available at sporting clubs and gyms.9 Using the test is simple:
you swipe the inside of someone's mouth with a cotton swab con-
tained in the package and then send it to a laboratory in a pread-
dressed envelope.' 0
Wouldn't almost every parent want to know if their child might be
a future Michael Jordan? Wouldn't many people like to have known
about their unexpected knack for golfing when they were young
enough to pursue it more seriously? Or, as in my case, to have known
about their complete lack of ability, so as not to waste any additional
time?
There are now more than one thousand tests available to analyze
genetic conditions," and the market for genetic testing is increasing at
a rate of 30 percent per year. 12 Many of these tests are the product of
an emerging trend to study complex human genetic traits rather than
disease-causing single-gene defects.' 3 Within the next ten years, sci-
entists will almost certainly be able to test for genes that implicate an
array of specific athletic abilities.14 This Note refers to such predictive
athletic testing as "non-pathologic elective testing" or "NPET" in or-
7 j. Savulescu & B. Foddy, Comment: Genetic Test Available for Sports
Performance, 39 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 472 (2005).
8 Wallace, supra note 6, at 5.
9 Cathy O'Leary, Genetic Test Kit to Pick Sports Stars, W. AUSTL., Nov. 23,
2004, available at http://esvcOO 1 057.wicOO5u.server-web.com/archives/1/220/677/
WA%20ACTN3%20231104.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
1o Id.
11 April Lynch, Advances in Genetics Bringing Hope and New Hazards for
Health, MERCURY NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), Jul. 25, 2004.
12 David C. Bonnin, The Need for Increased Oversight of Genetic Testing: A
Detailed Look at the Genetic Testing Process, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 149,
153 (2003).
13 Compare SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING (SACGT),
DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON OVERSIGHT OF
GENETIC TESTS (2000), available at http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/reports/
public consultationdocument.htm (defining "gene testing" as analysis to determine
whether "a mutation is present that is causing or will cause a certain disease or [latent
pathologic] condition"), with Orli Bahcall et al., Research Highlights, Making Mus-
cles, 37 NATURE GENETICS 347 (2005) (noting recent developments in genetic re-
search related to muscle development).
14 See Tom Farrey, Genetic Testing Beckons, ESPN.cOM, Jun. 3, 2004, http://
espn.go.com/otl/athlete/monday.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) (referencing Lee
Silver, Geneticist and Molecular Biologist, Princeton Univ.).
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der to distinguish it from other types of genetic tests, especially those
that diagnose latent physical or behavioral pathology. The first gen-
eration of genetic tests designed as commercial ventures has already
entered the American market with virtually no regulatory oversight.'
5
Despite their dubious clinical validity, many new tests are being sold
without a physician intermediary.1
6
Obtaining personal health information may implicate important
aspects of privacy and autonomy, and there may be social and indi-
vidual benefits to being able to plan.' 7 On the other hand, the potential
"harms" of unregulated testing may warrant some state intervention. 8
Balancing these and other competing interests requires examining
whether the concepts of "medicine" and "consent" that have devel-
oped over the last half-century are relevant in this context.' 9 Perhaps,
they are not. Non-pathologic genetic testing might raise unique con-
cerns about consumer protection that are more analogous to problems
successfully addressed outside of the medical arena, such as legal
rules concerning lending practices and vaccines.
This Note argues that non-pathologic elective testing raises con-
cers that should not be addressed by simply extending the informed
consent framework; instead, it proposes an information-based inter-
vention based on the ."truth in lending" paradigm. Part I traces the
intersection of law and genetics from eugenics to modem concerns
15 Letter from Reed V. Tuckson, M.D., SACGHS Chair, Dep't. of Health &
Human Servs., to the Honorable Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs. (Dec. 8, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Thompson]. See Neil A.
Holtzman, FDA and the Regulation of Genetic Tests, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 53, 56 (2000)
(noting the conflict of interest inherent in physicians and patients only receiving in-
formation from the producers of a specific test). Interestingly, The U.K. Human Ge-
netics Commission, the U.K. government's advisory body, recently issued a report
noting that some home-testing products, e.g, a test for cystic fibrosis carrier status,
were withdrawn from the market due to weak consumer demand. However, the report
also noted that the market for direct-to-consumer genetic tests might gain momentum
as quickly as the home pregnancy kits did. HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, GENES DIRECT: ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS
SUPPLIED DIRECTLY TO THE PUBLIC 8, 11 (2003) (U.K.), http://www.hgc.gov.uk/
UploadDocs/DocPub/Document/genesdirect_full.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN GENETICS
COMM'N U.K.].
16 Thompson, supra note 15.
17 HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N U.K., supra note 15, at 28-29.
Is Legal commentators agree that some regulation is needed to fill the void
that currently exists for genetic testing. E.g., Anny Huang, FDA Regulation of Ge-
netic Testing: Institutional Reluctance and Public Guardianship, 53 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 555, 591 (1998).
19 Lori Andrews & Erin Shaughnessy Zuiker, Ethical, Legal, and Social
Issues in Genetic Testing for Complex Genetic Diseases, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 808
(2003) (noting the importance of informed consent in the medical context).
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towards differentiating non-pathologic elective testing from other
genetic tests. Part II sets out the conventional legal framework for
patient-physician decision-making and traces the history of regulation
to the modem void. Part III begins by demonstrating the strong anal-
ogy between non-pathologic genetic tests and consumer lending in the
1960s. It proceeds by proposing a similar solution to problem at hand
and making the case. This Note concludes by advocating that an in-
formation-based regulatory regime would be the most efficient and
effective way of ensuring consumer protection without hindering
growth in this exciting new area of biotechnology.
I. NOT ALL GENETIC TESTS ARE THE SAME
A. The Historical Intersection of Law and Genetics
Genetic technology is often criticized as an extension of this
country's eugenic movement.2a In The Republic and the Laws, the
Greek philosopher Plato promoted selective breeding as a means to-
wards a utopian world. 1 It was the first time in recorded history that
someone had advanced eugenics,22 a term that would later be invented
and defined by the biologist Francis Galton in the wake of his uncle
Charles Darwin's theories of evolution and natural selection. 3 Galton
intended "eugenics" to mean "well-born" and to capture his concept
of using knowledge about genetics and quantitative analysis to better
the human condition. 4
At the turn of the century, eugenics involved a social, scientific,
and political movement both in the United States and Europe; the
ideas were pervasive and well-distributed across the geography and
20 See generally Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the
Human Genome to Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. &
MED. 1 (2002) (discussing how the American eugenics movement has continually
colored reactions to genetic science).
21 PLATO, LAWS 145-46 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Prometheus Books 2000)
(stating that "[t]he bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to produce for
the state .... "); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 98 (I.A. Richards trans., W.W. Nor-
ton & Company 1942) (stating that "the best men [should be] married to the best
women as frequently as possible" because "you get the best offspring only by uniting
the best....").
22 RICHARD LYNN, EUGENICS: A REASSESSMENT 3 (2001).
23 David J. Galton & Clare J. Galton, Francis Galton: and Eugenics Today,
24 J. MED. ETHICS 99, 99 (1998).
24 Francis Galton, Probability, The Foundation of Eugenics, The Herbert
Spencer Lecture (June 5, 1907) in PROBABILITY, THE FOUNDATION OF EUGENICS (Clar-
endon Press 1907); FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT (1883).
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socioeconomic classes of western civilization.25 An American Eugen-
ics Society was created in Cold Spring Harbor, NY.26 The society's
propaganda included publications assuring readers that eugenics was
not a plan for making supermen or for breeding human beings as if
they were animals; instead, the group promised eugenics would "in-
crease the number of geniuses," foster "more selective lovemaking,"
and "produce more love in marriage. 27 Politicians awarded "fittest
family" and "better babies" awards to local families at fairs across the
country.28 The American eugenics movement is often said to have
culminated in the landmark Supreme Court decision of Buck v. Bell in
which Justice Holmes upheld Virginia's compulsory sterilization law
with the now infamous language:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains com-
pulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fal-
lopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.29
"Eugenics," however, quickly shifted from a term inspiring praise
and connotations of social patriotism to a moniker associated with
intolerance, human violation, state oppression, and mad science. 30 The
horrors of the Holocaust and forced sterilization programs inspired by
the eugenic movement still provoke strong views concerning
genetics. 31 Indeed, this historic pseudo-science is often invoked to
criticize new genetic technology despite the attenuated and often
forced connection.32
Perhaps the closest link between historical eugenics and today's
genetic testing (including testing for disease) involves the prenatal use
of genetic tests. There are reasonable arguments that in limited cir-
25 See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Genera-
tions of??? Are Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 191, 208-10 (2003).
26 Id. at 202-03.
27 DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 61 (2d ed. 1995).
28 E.g., Lombardo, supra note 25, at 210.
29 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citation omitted). The first sterili-
zation law was enacted in 1907, but "[b]y 1981, a majority of States [had] adopted
sterilization laws to 'correct' apparent genetic traits or tendencies." Genetic Informa-
tion Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, S. 306, 109th Cong. § 2(2) (2005) (as passed by
Senate on February 17, 2005) (findings in support of bill).
30 See, e.g., KEVLES, supra note 27, at 164-75.
31 E.g., Lombardo, supra note 25, at 202.
32 See, e.g., Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Chil-
dren: Our Eugenics Past-Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REv. 125 (2003).
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cumstances preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD33) as well as pre-
natal testing used in conjunction with abortion share some ethical
similarities to the old eugenics movement.34 However, in relation to
NPET the discussion has little practical application.
While PGD and selective abortion are already employed as a pro-
phylactic against diseases like Cystic Fibrosis, Huntington's disease,
and Down's syndrome,35 there is little risk that the same procedures
will be used for NPET. Assuming people were interested in pre-natal
NPET and a physician were willing to provide it (neither of which is
likely), the medical procedures currently used to collect genetic in-
formation in vitro present a risk of fetal death.36 Depending on which
procedure is used, the risk may be as high as 2-6 percent.37 In addition
to the risk of killing the fetus, any information that might be provided
by the current tests would be very low quality. Not only do the tests
lack empirical support, but recent research increasingly illustrates the
importance of non-genetic factors in human development.38 In fact,
many geneticists now believe that a person's environment is not only
critical to development but might change human genes themselves.39
Some researchers even believe that gene expression might be so sensi-
33 This is also often referred to as preimplantation genetic testing (PGT).
Both names refer to the process of testing embryos for particular genetic traits before
implanting them in the uterine wall-in a general sense, this is an extension of the
more commonly known process of in vitro fertilization (IVF).
34 David S. King, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and the "New'" Eugen-
ics, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 176 (1999) (arguing that the current regime of genetic testing
is "eugenic in purpose and outcome" and asserting that surveys of doctors in other
areas of the world view that as acceptable). See Galton & Galton, supra note 23, at
100-01 (discussing the sterilization of those with "inferior" traits to eliminate those
less suitable for reproduction on the eugenics register); Solveig Magnus Reindal,
Disability, Gene Therapy and Eugenics - A Challenge to John Harris, 26 J. MED.
ETHICS 89 (2000).
35 E.g., Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Mother-
hood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 968-70 (1996).
36 Id. at 968.
37 Id. (chorionic villi sampling and amniocentesis are the most common
procedures).
38 See A. M. Pensgaard & G. C. Roberts, Elite Athletes' Experiences of the
Motivational Climate: The Coach Matters, 12 SCANDNAVIAN J. MED. & SCI. SPORTS
54 (2002) (exploring the personal and motivational factors that influence elite ath-
letes).
39 See R. George Wright, Personhood 2. 0: Enhanced and Unenhanced Per-
sons and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 1047, 1056 nn.45-
46 (2005) (noting the possibility that a pregnant woman's diet impacts gene expres-
sion of the pre-partum fetus).
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tive that it is affected by seemingly minor factors like a person's
diet.4
0
Non-pathologic testing is unlike eugenics in another important
way: it does not infringe on personal autonomy because of govern-
mental or societal pressure. Unlike state-sponsored forced sterilization
programs or the Nazi practices, people would be able to make their
own choices about whether to test and what to test for. The increas-
ingly global modern community might have viewpoints as diverse
about the importance of a set of physical qualities as they do about
which athletic competitions are exciting.4' The chance that parents
would feel compelled to test their progeny to prevent them from being
beneath the rising bar of normalcy is relatively small with NPET.42 It
would be virtually impossible to test for a range of characteristics. For
example, a predisposition to muscular legs would not necessarily be
accompanied with a particular hair color or body size. Would it be
desirable to test positive for bulk muscle, if the chances were higher
that it would mean a hulking behemoth with nothing upstairs? Finally,
there is little risk that ideological rationales will masquerade as sci-
ence in the same way they did in the middle of the last century.
Broad concerns that genetic testing might lead to societal change
are more academic than immediate, and a considerable amount of
scholarship already addresses them. On a more practical level, direct-
to-consumer marketing of NPET creates a pressing problem that
needs to be addressed: NPET is already being sold to consumers
around the world. The risks presented by these tests are unlike eugenic
concerns and also unlike the concerns presented by the genetic diag-
nosis of disease more generally.
B. General Concerns of Genetic Testing
Traditional, disease-centered genetic testing poses potential psy-
chological and socioeconomic risks to both individuals who are tested
as well as people with whom they share genes. Unlike traditional
medicine where many of the risks stem from direct physical interven-
tion, the principal risks of genetic testing relate to the information that
40 1d; G. P. Riley, Gene Expression and Matrix Turnover in Overused and
Damaged Tendons, 15 SCANDINAVIAN J. MED. & SCI. SPORTS 241, 247-48 (2005)
(outlining recent research that indicates gene expression in human tendons might be
affected by consistent muscle fatigue).
41 Parents desiring a star sumo wrestler would target very different physical
characteristics than those who desired a jockey.
42 But see BRYAN APPLEYARD, BRAVE NEW WORLDS: STAYING HUMAN IN THE
GENETIC FUTURE 85-86 (1999) (discussing the possibility that a rising bar of nor-
malcy might make people feel compelled to test).
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is revealed about the patient's genetic status.43 Intuitively, a person's
self-image and relationship to others might drastically change upon
learning about their carrier status. In the case of Huntington's disease,
this might involve discovering an accurate age range in which you are
likely to die of the disease. 44
Latent diseases that can be detected through the use of genetic
tests include Huntington's disease, Tay-Sachs disease, X-linked mus-
cular dystrophies, and cystic fibrosis. 45 People affected by some dis-
orders begin life asymptomatic and appear healthy at birth.46 For ex-
ample, the symptoms of someone affected by Huntington's disease
generally begin between the ages of twelve and thirty-five.47 Symp-
toms of that disease typically begin with jerking movement of limbs,
mental illness, and progressively get worse until death.48 New genetic
technology might be able to detect increased risk for things like can-
cer, hypertension, and Alzheimer disease.49
The psychological harms caused by receiving information about
such a serious condition include deflated self-image, anxiety, guilt,
and perceived and actual social stigma.50 There is no question that
psychological reactions to the results of a genetically-diagnosed dis-
ease can be strong and unpredictable. 51 Stanford University's recom-
mendations on genetic testing bluntly state "[that] genetic counseling
is the linchpin of good care," and "[r]eleasing test results to unin-
formed or unprepared patients can cause serious psychological
43 Ronald M. Green & A. Mathew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing Fea-
turesfor Policy Analysis, I 1 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 571, 572 (1998).
44 See DR Langbehn et al., A New Model for Prediction of the Age of Onset
and Penetrance for Huntington's Disease Based on CAG Length, 65 CLINICAL
GENETICS 267 (2004) (detailing how the number or length of trinucleotide expansions
correlates with the onset and manifestation of symptoms).
45 David Botstein & Neil Risch, Discovering Genotypes Underlying Human
Phenotypes: Past Successes for Mendelian Disease, Future Approaches for Complex
Disease, 33 NATURE GENETICS SUPPLEMENT 228, 228 (2003) (outlining the history of
connecting phenotypes to genotypes and noting that the gene for Huntington's disease
was mapped relatively early); Gideon Bach et al., Tay-Sachs Screening in the Jewish
Ashkenazi Population: DNA Testing Is the Preferred Procedure, 99 AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 70 (2001) (arguing that the preferred method to diagnose Tay-Sachs should
be DNA testing rather than testing blood samples for the Hex A enzyme despite the
impressive success of earlier models).
46 See, e.g., Langbehn et al., supra note 44, at 269-70.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comn. on Bioethics, Ethical Issues with Genetic
Testing in Pediatrics, 107 PEDIATRICS 1451, 1451 (2001).
50 Id.
51 Henry T. Greely, The Revolution in Human Genetics: Implications for
Human Societies, 52 S.C. L. REv. 377, 381 (2001).
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harm. 52 Nancy Wexler, the psychologist largely credited with dis-
covering the gene that controls Huntington's disease, describes a man
who was devastated to learn that he was perfectly healthy.5 3 Appar-
ently, the man conducted his whole life believing that he would only
live until thirty; thus, he dropped out of three colleges, never had a
long-term relationship, and was even arrested on white-collar criminal
charges.54
Psychological harms can also be caused by factors external to the
individual. Genetic testing for disease often leads to distortion of the
parents' perception of their child.5 5 For obvious reasons, people in
families with a history of genetically-linked disease also often claim
that genetic testing creates intra-family conflict.5 6 In one representa-
tive scenario, the genetic diagnosis of a latent disease led family
members to favor one child over another.57 Can you guess which
child? Finally, family members that test positive and others who test
negative may also experience feelings of resentment or guilt.
58
The second type of risk implicated by disease-centered testing is
not psychological but socioeconomic. Because of the predictive nature
of genetic tests, individuals who undergo disease-centered genetic
testing have reason to be concerned about the financial implications.5 9
Some of the risks reported in the mainstream media included people
being denied insurance or losing their job because of their genetic
status. 60 Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
received widespread media attention when they brought an action
against a railroad genetically testing employees who filed claims for
work-related injuries.6'
52 Bonnin, supra note 12, at 178 (quoting Barbara Koenig et al., Genetic
Testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2: Recommendations of the Stanford Program in Ge-
nomics, Ethics, and Society, 7 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH 531, 538 (1998)).
53 Greely, supra note 51, at 384.
54 Id.
55 See generally Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Genetics:
Views of Geneticists, Parents and Primary Care Physicians, 6 HEALTH L.J. 3, 8
(1998).
56 Greely, supra note 51, at 383.
57 See Wertz, supra note 55, at 8.
58 Id. at 9 (describing "survivor guilt" and the strain on intra-family relation-
ships caused by genetic diagnosis of disease).
59 See HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N U.K., supra note 15, at 12.
60 E.g., id. at 47. See Phil Bereano & Richard Sclove, Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Genetic Testing, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at C5 (noting that scientists
have documented hundreds of cases in which otherwise healthy people were denied
insurance because of genetic indications of a latent condition).
61 Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Prevent-
ing Genetic Discrimination, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1341, 1349-51 (2002); Press Release,
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The risks are real and siblings, parents, decedents, and others who
share the same genetic makeup necessarily have reverberative con-
cerns, because genes are shared among family members and genetic
information is easily stored.62 Potential discrimination might also cre-
ate another kind of secondary problem, if fear preempts best medical
practice or people are forced outside of the medical system for genetic
testing.
Many commentators have discussed the wide variety of topics at
the intersection of genetics and discrimination, and there is an espe-
cially robust amount of scholarship discussing insurers' use of genetic
information and the possibility of discrimination against people with
latent health condition(s).63 No federal laws dire.ctly or comprehen-
sively address these issues, and existing state legislation provides only
uncertain and inconsistent safeguards. 64 However, legislation recently
introduced in Congress addresses many of these concerns. 65 The two
virtually identical bills are both called the Genetic Information Non-
discrimination Act of 2005, and appear to have wide support in both
houses.66 The protection of the Act, if it eventually becomes law,
would also assuage the more minor concerns implicated by NPET.
C. Not Your Mom's Genetic Testing: Why Non-Pathologic Elective
Testing is Different
In one sense, non-pathologic elective testing is not a significant
departure from current practice. Scouts for major college and
university athletic programs scrutinize middle school students across
the country in the hope of finding great talent. And many athletic
EEOC Settles ADA Suit against BNSF for Genetic Bias (Apr. 18, 2001), http://www.
eeoc.gov/press/4-18-01.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).62 Green & Thomas, supra note 43, at 577-78.
63 E.g., Andrews & Zuiker, supra note 19, at 817-18.
64 Agnes Masny, Remarks at the Meeting of the Secretary's Advisory Com-
mittee on Genetics, Health, and Society (June 15, 2005) (closed caption text available
at http://www.webconferences.com/nihsacghs/15_jun_2005.html).
65 Id. Responding to the potential for discrimination in the areas of insurance
and employment, the Senate unanimously passed the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act of 2005 earlier this year. S. 306, 109th Cong. (2005). The House has
introduced similar legislation. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005,
H.R. 1227, 109th Cong. (2005). If passed, the federal legislation will eventually sup-
plement protections included in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1395b (2000), which established national
standards for the privacy of genetic information, is well as the patchwork of state
legislation that continues to be passed. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2801, 2802,
2804 (2000) (defining genetic tests and addressing confidentiality issues); CAL. INS.
CODE § 742.407 (West 2000) (proscribing insurance discrimination).
66 S.306; H.R. 1227.
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coaches already use non-genetic medical technology, like muscle
biopsies, to help select athletes. 67 Perhaps most significantly, no one
needs technology to understand that height correlates with success as
a basketball player, and parents already routinely use this type of non-
scientific assessment. Most commentators argue that the biggest
difference between current practice and genetic testing may just be the
quality of the information.68 Beyond the discussion of genetic
exceptionalism, 69 though, many of the potential "harms" of disease-
oriented testing are not applicable in the context of NPET.
Non-pathologic genetic tests would not have the same serious
psychological consequences as disease-oriented testing. Genetic tests
that diagnose disease typically involve pathologies that have no cure
or effective therapeutic intervention; affirmative test results mean the
person must live with the prospect of unavoidable illness.70 Unlike
individual beliefs about longevity, people generally do not become
heavily invested in convictions related to athletic stardom. Many chil-
dren dream of becoming a professional basketball or baseball player,71
but few would be devastated to hear that the odds are against them.
Realistically, many parents already impart this quickly-learned life
67 Farrey, supra note 14 (describing how Olympic rowers undergo muscle
biopsies and blood tests to help determine athletic potential and quoting the national
team coach's desire for genetic profiling). These coaches claim they would welcome
genetic profiling as another means of saving time and energy. Id.
68 Some commentators have suggested that while the quality of the informa-
tion remains suspect, non-therapeutic genetic tests should have legal restrictions,
because people confuse scientific information with proved information. Patrik S.
Florencio, Genetics, Parenting, and Children's Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 45
McGiLL L.J. 527, 530 (2000).
69 "Genetic exceptionalism" captures the discussion about whether or not
genetic information and genomics should be treated differently from types of medical
information. There is a common misconception that genes dictate a person's future.
Many commentators argue that this view is specious and dangerous. These arguments
are only tangentially relevant and comprise an interesting and important area of legal
scholarship that I could not begin to rehearse here. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin
& James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exception-
alism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 33-34 (1999); Henry T. Greely, Genotype Discrimina-
tion: The Complex Case for Some Legislative Protection, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1483
(2001); Hellman, supra note 4; Glenn McGee, Foreword: Genetic Exceptionalism, I 1
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 565 (1998); Mark A. Rothstein, Why Treating Genetic Informa-
tion Separately Is a Bad Idea, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 33 (1999); and Sonia M. Suter,
The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Leg-
islation?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 669 (2001).
70 Green & Thomas, supra note 43, at 572-73.
71 In light of recent realizations about steroid use in professional baseball,
perhaps soccer would have been a more appropriate example.
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lesson leaving children to live with an understanding that they will
almost certainly not become a professional athlete.
Beyond being less invested in the outcome, the results of the new
variety of tests are also far less reliable. The first successful genetic
tests diagnosed a mutation in a single series of genes or specific
location.72 However, these new types of tests often require analyzing
mutations in many different genes at the same time; logically, this is
inherently more complicated.73 Moreover, the presence of different
mutations may have varying degrees of significance: even if the
combination exists, it may only represent a slight increase in the
probability that something occurs.74 What could a person do with this
information? Would a rational person who is told that there is a 60
percent probability that she will be a good tennis player act any
differently than the person who is told that they have only a 50
percent chance? Many individuals might find information like this
useless, even if it was clinically very accurate.
The potential of institutional discrimination is also mitigated by
the quality and nature of information that might realistically be pro-
vided by NPET. Unlike genetic diagnosis of disease, non-pathologic
tests do not implicate risks that most people insure. It is common to
purchase insurance that protects against risks associated with automo-
bile accidents or death, but these are things people are adverse to. The
chance of becoming a stellar athlete is really a probability of success
and insurance against it not happening would give an athlete an ad-
verse incentive to intentionally fail. Insurance companies would
probably not be interested in this type of information, and, at this
point, it is unclear who might be practically capable of capitalizing on
it.
Discrimination on the basis of NPET results is perhaps most
likely where the decision to invest resources has already been made,
i.e., where there is already significant financial investment. Sporting
organizations of all kinds might use the information to manage and
select employees. An organization might choose to expend fewer
resources on an employee-athlete whose genetic profile indicates
frequent injury.76 Alternatively, educational institutions might use the
tests to select scholarship recipients and help allocate athletic
resources.
72 Andrews & Zuiker, supra note 19, at 803-05.
71 Id. at 805.
74 Id. at 806.
75 E.g., Ben Sellenger, Genetic Testing: The Future of Athlete Selection?, 2
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J., 207, 208-09 (2003).
76 Id. at 210.
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The danger which arises in this context is not from the tests actual
ability to predict potential, because research has yet to establish a de-
finitive link.7 The danger arises because athletic organizations might
act on the information either hoping the tests prove accurate or under
the false impression that the tests have some clinical utility. 78 The
actual discrimination aspect is addressed in the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act mentioned earlier, which is currently pending
before Congress.79 The Act defines "genetic test" broadly enough to
encompass these tests and provides restrictions that would limit the
use of the results.80 Discrimination is also proscribed in the Universal
Declaration of the Human Genome and Human Rights, which was
adopted unanimously by the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1997. 81 While the declara-
tion is a non-binding instrument, it is evidence of how seriously the
international community appears to respond to potential discrimina-
tion. Finally, potential abuses in the educational arena would most
likely incite a quick domestic legislative response, as problems afflict-
ing our children often do.82
Of course, there is one critical caveat. The relative seriousness of
potential individual and social harms assumes that the public under-
stands the limitations of non-pathologic tests, and they might not.
Many individuals believe that genetic information is the same as sci-
entific or proven information; obviously, quite the opposite is true.
83
Genetic tests of all kinds are only predictions, and they vary greatly in
terms of quality and importance.
8 4
Until recently, medical academics judiciously employed genetic
testing technology on an investigational basis.85 The academic
institutions focused on research rather than profit.8 6 And the
" Id. at 213.
78 id.
79 S. 306, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1227, 109th Cong. (2005).
80 S. 306, § 201(7); H.R. 1277 § 101(7)
8" G.A. Res. 152, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doe. A/53/625/Add.2 (1998)
(adopting Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, UN
Educ., Scientific and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], 29th Sess., 29 C/Resolution 19, re-
printed in Records of the General Conference, UNESCO, 29th Sess., 29 C/Resolution
19, at 41 (1997)).
82 C.f Janet L. Dolgin, The Law's Response to Parental Alcohol and
"Crack" Abuse, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1213, 1213 (1991) (asserting that the popular
reaction that led to protecting children of crack users created a regulatory regime that
was too stringent).
s3 Florencio, supra note 68, at 530.
84 See Andrews & Zuiker, supra note 19, at 804.
85 Holtzman, supra note 15, at 54.
86 E.g., id. at 56.
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physicians followed detailed informed consent requirements
established by the major medical organizations to ensure patients
made appropriate decisions before testing for latent disease. 7 The
market for genetic tests has now grown beyond the virtually self-
regulating world of medical academia, but the regulatory framework
has yet to catch up.
II. FIRST PRINCIPALS TO THE CURRENT REGIME
A. Informed Consent Yesterday & Today
In 1914, Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo eloquently as-
serted that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body[.]"88 Car-
dozo's declaration that a physician needed to obtain the patient's con-
sent became a fundamental concept to American jurisprudence and is
quoted or cited in almost every informed consent case.89 However, it
was not until 1957 that the courts started to recognize a logical exten-
sion of the physician's requirement to obtain consent: patients should
be given enough information to allow them to make a meaningful
decision about the course of their medical treatment.90
The requirement that the healthcare provider give enough infor-
mation to allow the patient to make an informed choice forms the sec-
ond prong of the doctrine and gives substance to the requirement of
consent. In hindsight, this basic requirement may seem an obvious
extension of the idea that physicians should not perform any proce-
dure against the patient's wishes, but it marked the beginning of dra-
matic changes in the social mores about the rights of patients and was
a significant departure from contemporary beliefs.91
87 See Andrews & Zuiker, supra note 19, at 807-08. The American College
of Medical Genetics recently "developed a policy statement discouraging direct ac-
cess to genetic testing without the involvement of an appropriately qualified health
care professional to ensure appropriate use, interpretation, counseling, and follow-
up." See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SEc'Y's ADVISORY COMM. ON
GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOCIETY, A ROADMAP FOR THE INTEGRATION OF GENETICS AND
GENOMICS INTO HEALTH & Soc'Y 57 (2004) [hereinafter ROADMAP], http://www4.od.
nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHSPriorities.pdf.
88 Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
89 SCOTT BECKER, HEALTH CARE LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 19.02[1][a] (2d
ed. 2005); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (asserting that
the concept of consent expressed by Cardozo in Schloendorff was a "root premise...
fundamental in American jurisprudence .... ).
90 JAMES M. MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A LEGAL GUIDE 13 (1986).
9' Id. at 12-13.
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The doctrine of informed consent evolved for thirty years before
this country's legal system universally accepted that a healthcare pro-
vider must 1) give the patient adequate information about her choices
and 2) obtain consent for the proposed treatment. While there is still
no consensus concerning the quality and nature of the information that
must be discussed,92 every state now has a specific informed consent
standard that dictates what a healthcare provider must do before any
medical diagnosis or treatment.93 Healthcare providers who do not
provide the appropriate amount or type of information before receiv-
ing the approval of the patient can be sued for medical malpractice or
an intentional tort.
9 4
There is a common misconception that informed consent is
merely the signing of a form that releases the physician from liability;
this grossly mischaracterizes the dynamic nature of the process.95
Generally, informed consent is comprised of authorization that is
given knowingly, rationally, and with volition, i.e., without coercion.
It is not a single event or episode, but a complex process where patient
decisions are made in conjunction with healthcare providers.96 This
process respects patients' interest in autonomy and hopefully
concludes in a decision about the best course of treatment for the
patient.
97
Unlike traditional medical procedures, NPET should not require
the kind of informed consent typically employed by physicians in the
medical context. The doctrine of informed consent was designed as a
response to very different problems, and the potential harms of NPET
are less serious and less numerable than they are in either the tradi-
tional medical context or even other areas of genetic testing. Despite
these tests relating to the human body, users are much more like con-
sumers than patients.
92 Andrew Popper, Averting Malpractice by Information: Informed Consent
in the Pediatric Treatment Environment, 47 DEPAuL L. REv. 819, 820 (1998).
93 Robert L. Stenger, Exclusive or Concurrent Competence to Make Medical
Decisions for Adolescents in the United States and United Kingdom, 14 J.L. &
HEALTH 209, 210-12 (1999-2000).
94 Popper, supra note 92, at 821.
95 FAY A. RozovsKy, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1:1 (3d
ed.920036 Tara L. Kuther, Medical Decision-Making and Minors: Issues of Consent
andAssent, 38 ADOLESCENCE 343, 344 (2003) (discussing the importance of informed
consent in healthcare).
97 See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF




The principal that every human being has a right to make
decisions based on accurate information is still important in this
context though. Important life decisions might be based on erroneous
information if users have unwarranted faith in the results of NPET:
this is a real problem. This unwarranted faith might exist because of
popular misconceptions about genetics, but it could be exploited by
charlatans who will no doubt take advantage of vulnerable consumers.
Obviously, the regulatory regime should attempt to eliminate these
misconceptions, thus ensuring that consumers understand and freely
choose the risks they assume. But there is currently little, if any,
protection.
B. The Current Regulatory Regime
Discussions concerning the public policy implications of regulat-
ing genetic testing began in the late 1990s against the background of
the American eugenics movement and in the face of impressive and
promising new discoveries. 98 In response to escalating public concern
and calls from two working groups commissioned jointly by the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Energy
(DOE), the former Secretary of Health and Human Services chartered
the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (SACGT) in
June, 1998.99 SACGT was formed "to advise the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) on the medical, scientific, ethi-
cal, legal, and social issues raised by the development and use of ge-
netic tests." 100
The first task SACGT undertook was a thorough evaluation of the
oversight of genetic tests. 10 SACGT concluded that changes in the
regulatory framework were necessary to bring all types of genetic
tests under the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) control and
to educate the public about the benefits and concerns of genetic test-
98 See generally Geetter, supra note 20 (discussing how the American eugen-
ics movement has continually colored reactions to genetic science).
99 Notice of Establishment of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Ge-
netic Testing, 63 Fed. Reg. 35242 (June 29, 1998); About SACGT, http://www4.od.
nih.gov/oba/sacgtlaboutsacgt.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006); Bonnin, supra note 12,
at 151. SACGT's charter was not renewed by the current administration, but a new
committee named the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and
Society (SACGHS) was chartered.
100 NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING,
ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT
vi (2000), http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/reports/oversight report.pdf [hereinafter
SACGT RECOMMENDATIONS].
101 Id. This report continues to serve as a useful summary of U.S. regulatory
mechanisms.
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ing. 0 2 A wide range of commentators have agreed with the Commit-
tee's assessment.' °3 Despite the numerous calls for a defined regula-
tory regime, there have been few changes since the committee's initial
report, and the FDA only recently began to solicit comments about
potential increases in regulation.' 04
Because the existing regulatory scheme does not distinguish be-
tween genetic and non-genetic testing, by default, genetic tests are
subject to the same type of federal oversight as any other medical
test. 0 5 The failure to alter the approach has led to a patchwork of fed-
eral regulations based more on the form of the genetic test than the
substance. 0 6 Essentially, genetic tests fall into two camps: tests sold
as kits107 and tests that are offered as a service by the laboratories
themselves (these are often referred to as "home brews").10 8 Although
regulation appears imminent, at this point there is little oversight of
the latter of type of test.'09
Genetic tests that are sold as kits and distributed to laboratories or
physicians require approval by the Food and Drug Administration
under the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)." ° The FDA classifies tests into three
categories according to the level of risk associated with their use."'
Because of their inherent complexity, genetic tests generally fall into
the most stringent category: Class III devices.' 2 This class of devices
requires pre-market approval by the FDA." 3 In order to get this ap-
proval, manufacturers must submit an application that includes em-
102 Id. at 16, 27.
103 See, e.g., Holtzman, supra note 15, at 53-54 (endorsing SACGT's proposal
to have the FDA oversee all genetic testing).
104 HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N U.K., supra note 15, at 75. See Cooperative
Agreement to Support the Illinois Institute of Technology's National Center for Food
Safety and Technology; Notice of Intent to Accept and Consider a Single Source
Application; Availability of Funds for Fiscal Year 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 25408 (May 6,
2004).
105 See Bonnin, supra note 12, at 158-59.
106 Huang, supra note 18, at 587.
107 Assuming there has been no illegal trade in kits, the buyers have been
limited exclusively to laboratories.
108 Huang, supra note 18, at 557 n.16.
109 Bonnin, supra note 12, at 160.
110 Id. at 159-60.
II Id




pirical data about clinical validity.1 4 The application is then reviewed
by an FDA examiner who specializes in genetic tests.115
While the FDA reviews tests sold as kits, the majority of genetic
tests are developed and marketed as clinical laboratory services for
which there is virtually no oversight. 16 Companies that accept sam-
ples in the mail would be included in this category," 7 as would the
vast majority of the 105 unique Internet sites that were offering ge-
netic testing services directly to consumers in 2003.18 Current regula-
tions do not ensure the utility or clinical validity of any of these ser-
vices.' 19 Genetic tests that fall into this category are only indirectly
regulated through the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments
(CLIA).' 20 CLIA was passed by Congress in 1998 to establish mini-
mum quality levels in laboratory testing practices. 121 Under the au-
thority granted by CLIA, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) reviews laboratories across the country for technical compe-
tence and analytic validity.
22
In addition to the limited oversight provided by CLIA and the
FDA, existing federal regulations govern research that "involves hu-
man subjects or identifiable samples of their DNA."' 23 The Human
Research Subject Protection Laws are administered by two different
federal agencies. 24 Both agencies require Institutional Review Board
(IRB) studies that focus on "1) safety of the subjects; 2) sufficiency of
the informed consent process; and 3) balance of the risks and potential
benefits of the study."'125 However, test developers that do not receive
federal funding and develop tests as services, fall outside the ambit of
the human research laws. 126 As a result, the majority of new ventures
114 Huang, supra note 18, at 588; Holtzman, supra note 15, at 58.
115 Id. The FDA's process for approving new products is complex. The spe-
cific details of the process and related issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
116 Id. at 587.
117 Id.
118 ROADMAP, supra note 87, at 56.
"' Id. at 57.
120 Huang, supra note 18, at 587.
121 Bonnin, supra note 12, at 163.
122 Holtzman, supra note 15, at 57. One frequently mentioned example of the
regulation of laboratories qua laboratories is the requirement that manufacturers who
sell analyte specific reagents (ASRs), which is an indispensable component of genetic
testing, must register with the FDA. However, laboratories that manufacture reagents
for their own use do not have to register. Id. at 59.
123 SACGT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 100, at 10.
124 Bonnin, supra note 12, at 164-65.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 165.
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developing non-pathologic tests are under no obligation to comply,
and few have sought IRB approval.
127
Beyond the limited federal regulation, state governments have an
oversight function that might eventually play a more prominent role.
For the time being, though, state legislation shares many of the same
problems of the federal regime. State health agencies, particularly
state public health laboratories, have licensure requirements for per-
sonnel and facilities that perform genetic tests.128 A handful of states
"have promulgated regulations that go beyond the [quality assurance]
requirements" imposed by the federal Clinical Laboratory Improve-
ment Amendments. 129 And a few have even established licensing re-
quirements for genetic counselors. 30 Besides the indirect oversight
provided through laboratories and licensure, non-pathologic genetic
tests fall outside the bounds of most existing state legislation.
State legislation regulating the practice of medicine and medical
professionals has traditionally been left to the police powers of the
states, rather than the federal government. Practicing medicine with-
out a license is illegal in every state, and each state has its own licen-
sure requirements.' 3' However, several states have codified formal
definitions of what qualifies as practicing medicine, and genetic tests
do not fit that definition. 132 For example, Texas's statute defines
"practicing medicine" as "the diagnosis, treatment, or offer to treat a
mental or physical disease or disorder or a physical deformity or in-
jury by any system or method. '' 133 New York state defines the practice
of medicine as "diagnosing, treating, operating or prescribing for any
human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition.' 34 Most
genetic testing does not diagnose physical injury or disease; rather, it
127 Holtzman, supra note 15, at 59.
128 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Regulatory Developments in Ge-
netic Testing in the United States, http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,2340,en_2649
34537 2674095 1 1_1_1 ,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
- 9 Id.; Gail H. Javitt et al., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests, Government
Oversight, and the First Amendment: What the Government Can (and Can 't) Do to
Protect the Public's Health, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 251, 274 (2004). Seventeen states have
also prohibited direct consumer access to laboratory testing. ROADMAP, supra note 87,
at 57.
130 Allen C. Nunnally, Note, Commercialized Genetic Testing: The Role of




133 TEx. OCc. CODE ANN. § 151.002(a)(13) (Vernon 2004) (providing the full
definition of "practicing medicine" which requires a public profession of status as a
"physician or surgeon", or for compensation for services).
134 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2001).
2006]
HEALTH MATRIX
provides information about the possibility of a latent condition in an
otherwise healthy person. Non-pathologic genetic testing is even fur-
ther beyond the ambit of these statutes, because no disease or pathol-
ogy is involved.
Many states have also codified definitions of "genetic testing" as
part of legislation designed to prevent discrimination by insurance
companies and employers. Non-pathologic tests fall outside the
bounds of these laws as well. Rhode Island's relatively recent legisla-
tion defines "genetic testing" as "analysis of an individual's DNA...
to detect heritable disease-related genetoypes.', 135 Non-pathologic
tests would also be outside of the bounds of the Texas statute that
defines "genetic test" as a "presymptomatic laboratory test of an indi-
vidual's genes ... associated with the individual's having a statisti-
cally increased risk of... developing a clinically recognized disease,
disorder, or syndrome .... ,,136
Of the approximately one thousand genetic tests that are now
available in the clinical setting, many of them fall outside the bounds
of the existing system.1 37 But the solution is not simply to attempt to
bring all genetic tests back into the medical profession, because these
new tests pose little threat to the informed consumer and unwarranted
intervention might slow the growth in this exciting new area of
science.
III. PROPOSAL
A. Truth in Lending
The historical events leading up to policy discussions about con-
sumer credit and ultimately the passage of the Truth in Lending Act
38
(TIL Act) bear a striking resemblance to the recent developments in
non-pathologic elective genetic testing. During the 1960s, the con-
sumer credit market was expanding at a ferocious pace. 139 As the
market blossomed, increased confusion about the terms of credit
135 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-2.1(4)(i) (2003) (defining "Genetic testing" and
providing a list of broadly defined "clinical purposes" for "genetic testing").
136 TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 58.001(5) (Vernon 2004).
137 E.g., Andrews & Zuiker, supra note 19, at 806.
138 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000).
139 E.g., RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRuTH IN LENDING 12 (Robert
A. Cook et al. eds., 2000) (detailing how consumer credit grew rapidly and formed its
own identity, distinct from the general consumer market); Elwin Griffith, Searching
for the Truth in Lending: Identifying Some Problems in the Truth in Lending Act and
Regulation Z, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 265 (2000).
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agreements amplified the existing predatory lending problem. 40 Many
consumers unwittingly contracted for complex products, which lend-
ers were using to keep them uninformed about the important aspects
of the agreement. 1
41
Some of the more innocent practices that lenders employed in-
volved creating their own informational barriers in the marketplace by
disguising the true cost of consumer debt and other information neces-
sary for consumers to make informed decisions. For example, lenders
quoted interest rate charges in a variety of ways that made compari-
sons for the average consumer very difficult. 142 They advertised "sim-
ple" interest rates with fees as well as "discount" or "add-on" rates,
but no figure approached the true annualized cost of the agreement.'
43
The use of these obfuscations and others to take advantage of vulner-
able consumers was made possible by the lack of uniformity in state
legislation and local practices. 44
Congress passed the TIL Act in 1968 to combat these problems.
45
Historically, the legislative responses to predatory lending included
mandating interest rate maximums, i.e., usury laws, or providing am-
nesty for debtors. 146 However, the various types of market-controlling
strategies were either generally ineffective or eventually caused the
market to breakdown. 147 The TIL Act approach was a significant de-
parture from these conventional interventions; rather than control the
market, the act used techniques to help the market correct itself by
addressing the information asymmetry. 148 In order to do this, Congress
attempted to empower the consumer with information that would fa-
cilitate the informed use of credit by making various credit terms
140 See, e.g., ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 139, at 12.
141 Griffith, supra note 139, at 266-68.
142 See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Con-
sumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv.
807, 880 (2003).
143 Barry A. Abbott & John W. Campbell, The Truth in Lending Act After 15
Years: Its Goals and Its Limitations, 9 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1984) (discussing
the history of the credit market and details of various assumptions creditors used to
mislead the public).
144 See Peterson, supra note 142, at 880. Interestingly, one contemporary
high-cost lending manager contrasted the legal doctrine of informed consent with the
widespread practice in the lending industry of "assumed consent." Id. at 892.
14 Id. at 879-80.
146 See generally id
147 Id. (noting that when statutory maximums and other market controls did
not keep ace with market rates, the market stopped functioning).U4 Id. at 809-10.
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more readily comparable and allowing borrowers to harness their own
judgment. 149
Essentially, the TIL Act mandated meaningful disclosure in a for-
mat that was both understandable and uniform across the country. The
Act focused on assuring "standardized, complete, and accurate disclo-
sure of credit terms."1 50 It made the terms "finance charge" and "an-
nual percentage rate"'151 part of modern daily life. 52
Indeed, this type of solution, i.e., an informational approach, al-
lowed consumers to understand what they were contracting for and
compare their options. Adopting an information-based approach also
balanced the need to protect people at risk with the desire not to hin-
der socially useful trade and had a number of regulatory advantages,
e.g., the low cost.
While the seemingly simple goals of the TIL Act were initially
difficult to implement, major difficulties, like problems with litigation
and compliance, have largely been resolved.153 More importantly, two
and a half decades of experience has provided invaluable insight into
the regulatory benefits and challenges of addressing informational
deficiencies in the consumer market.
54
B. Truth in Testing-The Proposed Mandatory Disclosures
The underlying problems of the 1960s consumer credit market are
virtually identical to modern concerns about non-pathologic elective
genetic testing. Despite occurring in different eras, the two situations
are analogous. From a historical perspective, non-pathologic elective
tests recently entered a stage of market development similar to the one
that afforded unscrupulous lenders the ability to take advantage of
consumers in the 1960s. Consumer credit was then the fast-growing
market that genetic testing is today. The market for genetic testing is
growing at a ferocious rate. 55 Charlatans have already begun to prey
on vulnerable consumers.
149 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000) (stating that the purpose
for the TIL Act is to inform consumers about the use of credit and to foster competi-
tion among financial institutions).
150 ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 139, at 11.
151 APR, the acronym derived from the phrase, is perhaps even more identifi-
able and surely as ubiquitous.
152 See Peterson, supra note 142, at 880.
113 E.g., id. at 886. See also Abbott & Campbell, supra note 139, at 3-4 (as-
serting that the lending laws were a "morass of complex and sometimes contradictory
rules" in the 1970s).
154 Note that these techniques are now used to address market deficiencies
with similar consumer products. See infra Part II.E-F.
155 E.g., Bonnin, supra note 12, at 153.
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In both situations the lack of accurate and understandable infor-
mation leaves consumers ill-equipped to make very important per-
sonal decisions. Moreover, the varying state responses to the credit
market contributed to even greater consumer confusion'5 6 in the same
way that the modem patchwork of incoherent state and federal regula-
tion will hurt NPET consumers today. 157 The scheme of intervention
crafted by Congress more than two decades ago is an ideal strategy for
regulating non-pathologic genetic tests today.
Drawing from the TIL paradigm, the framework for a NPET re-
gime would serve two important functions: mandating disclosure to
the consumer and ensuring national standards to describe the quality
of genetic tests. Towards this end, the FDA should issue regulations
mandating that all genetic tests-both NPET and pathologic-sold to
consumers in the United States include a one page information sheet
drafted by the FDA, which would include easy-to-read information
about the technological state of genetic testing as well as the potential
benefits and harms. The FDA should also mandate that the tests them-
selves be accompanied by limited manufacturer-provided information,
including what specific genes are being tested, a succinct statement of
the test's purpose, recent and relevant research supporting the test's
conclusion, and other relevant medical information. Both types of
disclosure should accompany genetic tests and be available from the
manufacturer to any potential consumers.
C. The FDA Should Promulgate and Enforce the Proposed
Regulations
Among the current morass of regulatory bodies, the FDA and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will likely play some role in the
federal oversight of genetic testing, because sales will likely take
place in the broader context of direct-to-consumer marketing of medi-
cal products. For the reasons outlined below, though, the FDA is the
most appropriate government actor for the intervention proposed here.
At the most general level, the FDA has primary jurisdiction over
labeling and advertising prescription drugs and certain medical de-
vices. The Administration's given mission is to "protect the public
health by ensuring that ... there is reasonable assurance of the safety
156 See, e.g., Abbott & Campbell, supra note 139, at 3-4, 9.
157 Uncertainty about whether the federal regime preempts state claims exists
in relation to even more seasoned devices. See generally, Sasha B. Rieders, Note,
State Law Tort Claims and the FDA: Proposing a Consumer-Oriented Prescription in
Medical Device Cases, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1159, 1175-77 (2004).
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and effectiveness of devices intended for human use."' 58 On the other
hand, the FTC regulates advertising more generally, including adver-
tising for medical products other than those that are "restricted medi-
cal devices."' 59
These new tests pose interesting questions about the two agencies'
jurisdiction. Home brew sales are likely to occur on the Internet,16°
where it is unclear whether it would be possible for the FDA to
regulate the content as "advertising," which is not defined in the
federal FDCA. 161 It is also unclear whether such web content would
be within the jurisdiction of the FDA or that of the FTC.162 But even if
regulating web content is beyond the ambit of the current regulatory
regime, the damage of the potentially misleading statements could be
mitigated by mandating the disclosure proposed here. And this
information is more closely related to the FDA's authority to regulate
the labeling of medical devices than any authority it has to regulate
advertising. Moreover, current legislation arguably already provides
the FDA the authority to mandate the inserts proposed here.
1 63
Section 701 gives the FDA general "authority to promulgate regu-
lations for the efficient enforcement" of the FDCA as well as a gen-
eral definitional power. 64 The most difficult legal hurdle appears to
be fitting home brew tests into the definition of "device," which typi-
158 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2000).
159 Working Agreement Between Federal Trade Commission and Food and
Drug Administration, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9850.01 (June 9, 1954) (as origi-
nally enacted); Updated FTC-FDA Liaison Agreement-Advertising of Over-the-
Counter Drugs, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9851 (Sept. 16,
1971).
160 ROADMAP, supra note 87, at 56.
16! Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000). The
FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research promulgated regulations that define
"advertising," but the definition is not comprehensive and only relates to advertise-
ments that are subject to section 502(n) of the FDCA. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(1)
(2004).
162 A spokesman from the FTC reported to the SACGHS last spring that the
Commission is currently looking for a test case and is concentrating on claims where
the actual harm is serious and has already occurred. Masny, supra note 64.
163 One commentator asserted that regulation does not require legislative
action, but simply a social and political mandate. Huang, supra note 18, at 591 (mak-
ing an interesting argument that the biggest problem is that intra-state laboratory
services might be beyond the ambit of the constitutional limits of federal powers).
Note that these concerns appear to have been laid to rest in a recent Supreme Court
decision. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005) (holding the production of
marijuana solely for home use, while an intrastate activity, still affects interstate
commerce to a substantial degree, thus allowing for Congressional regulation under
the Commerce Clause).
164 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000).
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cally excludes laboratory services. 65 The relevant definitional lan-
guage includes instruments "intended for use in the diagnosis of dis-
ease or other conditions ...,, Here, a case could be either be made
that a combination of analyte specific reagents (ASR) and lab process-
ing is a statutory device or that advertising a specific use for ASR
creates a statutory device; 167 thus, requiring pre-market approval and
making further regulation possible.
After establishing that the home brew tests are a medical device,
Section 201(m) of the FDCA states that labeling includes "all labels
and other written, printed, or graphic matter ... accompanying such
article." 168 The definition of "label," in turn, has been interpreted
broadly enough that the FDA could mandate the inserts proposed
here.169 From a practical perspective, it would make sense for the
agency to promulgate the regulations and hope for Congressional re-
sponse if the statutory basis is later successfully challenged.
To be clear, whether the FDA posses the authority to regulate is
not dispositive of either whether they are the most appropriate actor or
whether the regulations make sense from a practical perspective. In
this case, though, the FDA is the most attractive choice. And perhaps
more importantly, the proposed intervention would be a low cost solu-
tion to a pressing problem.
The modern era of the FDA began with the first wave of federal
regulatory legislation during the Roosevelt administration. 170 With
more than a century of regulatory experience, it is now one of the
largest and oldest government agencies. It has tended to grow in
spurts with public crisis. 171 Under the authority it has been granted to
regulate medical "devices," the agency claims responsibility for regu-
lating products as diverse as the toothbrush and processed human
heart valves.17
2
165 Holtzman, supra note 15, at 59-60.
'66 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (2000).
167 See cf Susan Bartlett Foote & Robert J. Berlin, Can Regulation Be as
Innovative as Science and Technology? The FDA's Regulation of Combination Prod-
ucts, 6 MiNN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 619 (2005) (noting many ways through which the
FDA has expanded its regulatory mandate).
168 21 U.S.C.S. § 32 1(m) (LexisNexis 2005).
169 See generally Foote & Berlin, supra note 167.
170 In 1906 Congress passed the Pure Food Act, which established the
agency's first regulatory power. Pure Food Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 768 Stat. 3915
(1906).
17i Huang, supra note 18, at 572-73.
172 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2000) (defining "device" generally for purposes of the
FDCA); Ala. Tissue Ctr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 378-79 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that a processed human heart valve is a device under the FDCA);
United States v. 2000 Plastic Tubular Cases, 231 F. Supp. 236, 238 (M.D. Pa. 1964)
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Beyond its size and history, the FDA has the technical expertise to
effectively implement and enforce the regulations proposed here. The
agency already regulates many other aspects of genetic testing. 73 For
example, the FDA currently regulates labeling and sales of ASRs.
74
The FDA also regulates genetic tests that are sold as kits to qualified
clinical laboratories.175  Twelve such kits have already been
approved. 176
D. Negligible Cost of Proposed Regulation
Regulations have become an indispensable part of the governing
process in this country. Federal oversight through administrative rules
and regulations has minimized damage to the environment, reduced
airplane disasters, and corrected market defects. However, such bene-
fits do not come without considerable costs. These costs and benefits
must be seriously considered in our world of limited resources. Gen-
erally, successful regulations generate social value because the bene-
fits outweigh the burdens. 77 But how do we know when this is true?
Often there is no simple and accurate way to make these calculations
even if there was consensus about the correct methodology.
78
Every year the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) esti-
mates the cost of the more significant recent domestic regulation in a
report it sends to Congress. In 2003, the OMB estimated the cost of
(holding that once a toothbrush entered interstate commerce it was subject to the
FDCA).
173 See supra Part II.B (delineating the various types of genetic tests currently
regulated by the FDA); Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, A False
Start? The Impact of Federal Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 YALE J. ON
REG. 163, 170-78 (1996) (noting the many new areas of biotechnology and how they
are being stifled by current regulation).
174 21 C.F.R. § 809.30 (2005) (restricting the sale, distribution and use of
analyte s ecific reagents).
Warning Letter from Steven I. Gutman, Director, Food & Drug Admin.
Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radio-
logical Health, to Ronald McGlennen, President, Access Genetics (July 29, 2005),
http://www.fda.gov/foi/wamingletters/g5424d.htm.
176 See generally U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological
Health, Recently Approved Devices, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/
cfdocs/cfl'opic/MDA/mda-list.cfn?list=3 (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (providing a list
of recently approved medical devices; three devices are currently listed under genetic
tests and test kits respectively).
177 E.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-
Benefit, Risk Vesus Risk Approach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U.
L. REv. 957 (2001).
178 E.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999) (presenting a slightly qualified defense of CBA).
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107 federal regulations to be between $36 and $42 billion a year. 179
On the other hand, the OMB estimated that the benefit of the same
regulations was approximately $146 to $230 billion. 80 The OMB
estimated the cost of major rules in the health and human services
sector alone to be more than $481 million.181
These figures are significant in relation to the size of the overall
domestic economy. 82 Serious thought should be given to the costs
and benefits of regulation before interfering in any sector of the econ-
omy, let alone one that promises as many benefits as genetic testing.
Here, the net benefit of mandating the proposed inserts appears to be
high and the costs low.
There are two principal costs associated with government regula-
tion that need to be estimated when weighing the burdens. The first is
the cost to the government itself. Here, the cost of promulgating and
enforcing the package inserts and other information is low. As noted
above, the FDA already has personnel approving genetic testing kits
and much of the infrastructure for the labeling is already in place;
thus, the additional cost to the government will be both small on the
margin, i.e., the FDA is the least-cost provider, and in aggregate.
Moreover, having one agency responsible for the inserts will avoid
redundancy and help accumulate institutional expertise, which will
reduce costs over time.
183
The second cost of regulation is incurred by industry and society
at large. These costs can be both actual private expenditures as well as
less tangible costs, both of which are generally greater and more im-
portant than the first type. But, this type of expenditure tends to be
difficult to measure. Unfortunately, the costs of regulation to a par-
ticular business are not divided up into line items like other expenses;
rather, regulatory expenses tend to be scattered across financial state-
ments or not included at all. For example, if fire regulations require
that no office worker sit within five feet of a fire exit, employees
might not have to be moved or might have to be moved for other rea-
179 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
ExEcuTivE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 3 (2003).
180 Id.
11Id. at 9 tbl.3.
182 E.g., Michael E. Chemew et al., Increased Spending on Health Care: How
Much Can the United States Afford?, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 15 (2003) (examining the
relationship between real per capita GDP and health care costs); Press Release, Bu-
reau of Econ. Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2005 (Mar. 30,
2006), http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelgdpnewsrelease.htm.
183 Huang, supra note 18, at 574.
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sons anyway. Either way, the expense of moving an employee might
be recorded in the financial statements in any number of ways. It
might be recorded as either a cost to human resources or to maintain-
ing the plant, or in both places.
Sometimes costs tend to be high up front, but decrease after the
initial outlay. For example, a drug manufacturer might have to make a
significant outlay to institute quality control procedures. But after the
system is set up, the cost of ongoing compliance could be dramatically
lower. Here, the costs to industry of including the proposed inserts
would be initially low and not increase. Cost of the inserts to industry
is likely to be dominated by expenses incurred to gather and write the
information.
The biggest potential cost might be stalling growth in this indus-
try. Future biotechnology will likely afford society an incredible
amount of benefits. Hindering the market with unneeded regulations
would slow the progress in this incredibly promising industry. While
mandating disclosure for all genetic tests might be somewhat over
inclusive, hopefully the burden of disclosure in the form of paper
handouts is relatively minimal on all fronts.
E. Information-Based Solutions in the Healthcare Context
Similar techniques are employed successfully in other healthcare
contexts. FDA-approved patient labeling is variously described as
"Information for the Patient," "Patient Information," "Medication
Guide," and "patient package inserts."184 One example of this labeling
is the method of disclosure employed to impart information before
children receive vaccinations. 85 Vaccinations, like non-pathologic
genetic tests, are administered to otherwise healthy children; in fact,
vaccinations are the only medical intervention mandated for healthy
children in the United States.' 86 Before administering a vaccination,
information regarding the benefits and risks must be provided to a
child's guardian.1 87 This formal disclosure information is provided by
the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC). 8 8 It comes in
'84 Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, the Bureau
of Econ., & the Office of Pol'y Planning of the Fed. Trade Comm'n, In the Matter of
Request for Comments on Agency Draft Guidance Documents Regarding Consumer-
Directed Promotion, Docket No. 2004D-0042 at 6 n. 13 (May 10, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/05/040512dtcdrugscomment.pdf.
185 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26 (2000) (mandating disclosure for vaccinations).
186 See Kristine M. Severyn, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Impact on Informed
Consent and Vaccine Policy, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 249, 249 (1995-1996).
117 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26.
188 Karin Schumacher, Note, Informed Consent: Should It Be Extended to
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the form of a standardized one-page, double-sided vaccine informa-
tion sheet (VIS) that presents the major risks and benefits of vaccina-
tions at a fifth to seventh grade reading level.189
In addition to the VIS, the manufacturer is required to include a
patient package insert.' 90 Patient package inserts are included in the
vial of each vaccine and include more detailed information than is
provided on the VIS. 191 These mandatory inserts supplement drug
manufacturers' traditional duty to warn the consumer directly about
the potential harms and benefits of the product.1 92 The manufacturer-
provided data is available to anyone, but physicians seldom provide it
to the patients when administering vaccines.1 93 Presumably, physi-
cians are accustomed to acquiring informed consent for other proce-
dures and impart the necessary information in an understandable way.
The same type of patient inserts, though, do reach patients when they
are included with medical products received directly by the con-
sumer. 194 The FDA has mandated inserts for various medicines, in-
cluding estrogenic products, some asthma devices, and progestational
drug products. 1
95
HIV home test kits are perhaps an even closer analog to the
intervention proposed here. In the late 1980s, the FDA incurred
significant criticism for its complete ban on HIV home testing kits,
which was imposed to protect the public from receiving serious health
information without a trained intermediary.' 96 The FDA reversed their
position in 1995 and now uses similar techniques to those proposed
here.' 97 The FDA already mandates and helps create the disclosures
that accompany home HIV test kits.' 98 The two tests share some
Vaccinations?, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 89, 96 (1999).
189 See Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many
Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353,
409 (2004); Schumacher, supra note 188, at 96.
190 See Bryan Christopher Moody, Prescription Medication and Consumer
Protection: A Time for Reform, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 19, 34 (1995-1996).
191 Schumacher, supra note 188, at 96-97.
192 See id.
'9' See id at 92.
194 See Moody, supra note 190, at 33-34.
'9' See id at 33.
196 Huang, supra note 18, at 571-72.
'9' See id at 572.
198 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Testing Yourself for HJV-1, the Virus that
Causes AIDS, http://www.fda.gov/cber/infosheets/hiv-home2.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2006) (warning consumers that the FDA has only approved one home HIV test
kit); R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 604 (2000) (outlining the FDA's extensive




common features. The distribution system of the HIV home test
system--consumers purchase the tests directly from the
manufacturer-mirrors how NPET is currently being distributed.199
The nature of the information being imparted is perhaps even more
serious with HIV testing where there have been similar problems of
institutional discrimination.
F. Advantages of a National Disclosure Regime
Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient
functioning of a free market economy. Packages and their la-
bels should enable consumers to obtain accurate information
200as to the quantity of the contents ....
If different state actors created or enforced disclosures, the market
would experience problems similar to consumer credit in the 1960s.
States would adopt different regimes and the patchwork of regulation
would remain ineffective. Communicating specific information to
consumers is complicated and needs to be done on the national level.
Specific word choice, format, and other seemingly mundane aspects
may be the difference between success and failure.20 1 And studies
show that too detailed a warning about health risks confuses consum-
ers.202 In regards to non-pathologic genetic tests, reinforcing the basic
idea that the clinical validity is dubious might sufficiently address
many of the potential problems even if more complicated ideas are
lost. In order to ensure that the enclosures impart the necessary infor-
mation, the designers could draw on lessons about effectively warning
consumers outside of healthcare.2 °3 The expansive body of scholarship
related to warnings digests the sum of regulatory experience and of-
fers the following lessons:
'99 William 0. Fabbri, Note, Home HIV Testing and Conflicts with State HIV
Testing Regulations, 21 Am. J.L. & MED. 419, 420 (1995) (noting that home HIV tests
will include a special paper for a blood sample and a return envelope).
200 Fair Packaging and Labeling Program, Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000).
201 Cf Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisti-
cians after All? Rethinking Some Conclusions of the Literature on Judgment under
Uncertainty, 58 COGNMON 1 (1996) (reporting that changing minor diction substan-
tially increased performance on an otherwise identical problem).
202 W. Kip Viscusi, Using Warnings to Extend the Boundaries of Consumer
Sovereignty, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 211, 230 (1999) (noting a study the author
conducted on hazard warnings used for pesticides that concluded very detailed risk
information confused consumers).
203 See generally Moody, supra note 190.
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[1.] The information should be presented as simply and as
clearly as possible, focusing on that which most affects the
consumer.
[2.] The information should be tailored as much as possible
to the individual consumer.
[3.] A common format for the information provided should
be used throughout the industry, if possible.
[4.] The information should be provided in such a way that
its meaning or import cannot easily be misrepresented or ex-
plained away by a seller of a good or service.
[5.] Informational remedies should avoid, to the extent pos-
sible, presenting the information in terms of probabilities.2°
Following these guidelines, a manufacturer-provided patient pack-
age insert and an information sheet should mitigate the problem that
consumers would misapprehend the nature of a non-pathologic elec-
tive test and genetic tests more generally. Relevant and accurate in-
formation would dispel false expectations about the results of NPET.
Federal disclosure laws would also guarantee that the information is
presented in a uniform fashion. Finally, appropriate disclosure would
empower individual consumers to make decisions about whether to
buy genetic tests; thus, creating an important prophylactic against
charlatans taking advantage of vulnerable consumers by disguising the
true nature of the service they are providing.
Information-based solutions, similar to those found in the TIL
Act, have political and theoretical advantages over other regulatory
responses.0 5 From a political standpoint, disclosure appeases both
advocates of consumer protection and advocates of laissez-faire solu-
tions.206 Consumer-protection advocates support mandating disclosure
as a way to empower the consumer. On the other end of the spectrum,
proponents of market-based solutions perceive disclosure as a rela-
tively non-intrusive technique. In addition, many parties who would
typically argue for less regulation recognize that there is a net benefit
204 Kurt Eggert, Truth in Gaming: Toward Consumer Protection in the
Gambling Industry, 63 MD. L. REV. 217, 262-64 (2004) (italics and capitalization
removed)




from disclosure laws, because disclosure facilitates a functional mar-
ket.2°7 There is a more efficient market because participants engaged
in fraudulent transactions will be forced to concede market share
when they are unable participate in a competitive market in which
purchasers can acquire adequate information. For these reasons, the
disclosure approach has garnered significant support in the consumer
credit context20 8 where it even receives "grudging acceptance" from
an industry that is vocal about its aversion to government oversight.20 9
From a theoretical perspective, information-based strategies work
well in quickly growing markets, in which the inherent changes con-
stantly create regulatory challenges. Classical economic thought rec-
ognizes that government action may be necessary to facilitate compe-
tition when externalities or imperfect information cause market failure
in these environments. 210 Fast growing markets, like genetic testing
and consumer credit in the 1960s, often experience this type of prob-
lem. Genetic tests could be sold over the Internet and analyzed by
laboratories in other countries. 21 1 Alternatively, genetic tests might be
packaged with other services in an effort to place them beyond the
bounds of regulation.21 2 Market controls, especially on the state level,
would simply be too difficult to implement.
Standardizing disclosure provided by manufacturers as well as
mandating an information sheet similar to the one created by the CDC
for vaccines would ensure that people receive sufficient information
to make an informed decision.213 With or without regulation, non-
pathologic tests will likely be sold directly to the consumer, so man-
dating information eliminates the possibility that patients would not
receive at least some objective and easily comprehensible informa-
tion. Because this industry is changing so rapidly, this sort of program
can also adapt to accommodate unforeseen changes. Variations in the
207 See id. at 902.
208 Id. at 880. But see Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending
Disclosures on Consumer Market Behavior: A Critique of the Critics of Truth-in-
Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 117 (1984) (asserting that even adequate dis-
closure laws cannot prevent consumers from many irrational decisions).
209 Peterson, supra note 142, at 881.
210 Id. at 880. Confronted with new competition, lenders unable to vie for
market share were forced to erect additional barriers to price shopping by increasing
"shopping costs" and targeting non-English speaking consumers. Id. at 892-94.
211 One government body addressing the issue expressed concern that this sort
of activity might be difficult to regulate and strain international relations. HUMAN
GENETICS COMM'N U.K., supra note 15. Obviously, the possibility that genetic testing
is done overseas creates a problem more aptly addressed by the federal government.
212 HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N U.K., supra note 15, at 7.
213 See supra Part III.B.
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accuracy or quality of individual genetic tests would be apparent from
the disclosure the manufacturer would include with the package.
Changes concerning the nature of the industry could easily be incor-
porated into the government-written disclosure.
CONCLUSION
Many critics of genetic tests raise concerns about direct-to-
consumer marketing and the harms that genetic testing for disease
might cause to the consumer in the absence of a healthcare provider or
genetic counselor.21 4 These critiques focus on how the tests are sold
and lament the lack of federal oversight of the process. 1 5 Unfortu-
nately, the Internet and other technology are making it more difficult
to control the process of how consumers acquire goods. Genetic test-
ing services with laboratories in offshore locations which advertise
over the Internet would be almost impossible to regulate, especially
on the state level. Rather than concentrating on the process, I believe
the more appropriate focus is on empowering parents and consumers
with the information they need to make informed decisions. Raising
individual knowledge about genetics would indirectly accomplish the
goal of making society at large more aware of the risks and benefits of
the new technology; thus, it would help dispel many of the unfounded
concerns and misunderstandings that are so common about genetic
technology.
Predictive testing for athletic ability is one of the first non-
pathologic tests that might have some clinical validity, but it will not
be long before many more begin to enter the stream of commerce. The
types of harms implicated by these new predictive tests are very dif-
ferent from both traditional medicine and other genetic tests. The lim-
ited harms in the non-pathologic context do not justify the cumber-
some process of informed consent that is conventionally employed in
the medical context; rather, consumers should be empowered with a
basic understanding of genetic testing and its clinically validity, so
that they can make informed choices. Society should draw on the les-
sons it has learned from addressing similar market deficiencies, rather
than stifling growth through over-regulation in this exciting new area
of biotechnology.
214 Javitt et at., supra note 129, at 298.
215 Id. at 298, 301.
2006]

